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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. Army is currently expanding its fleet of Health Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS) equipped aircraft at significant 
rates, to now include over 1,000 rotorcraft. Two different on-board HUMS, the Honeywell Modern Signal Processing Unit 
(MSPU) and the Goodrich Integrated Vehicle Health Management System (IVHMS), are collecting vibration health data on 
aircraft that include the Apache, Blackhawk, Chinook, and Kiowa Warrior. 
The objective of this paper is to recommend the most effective gear condition indicators for fleet use based on both a 
theoretical foundation and field data. Gear diagnostics with better performance will be recommended based on both a 
theoretical foundation and results of in-fleet use. In order to evaluate the gear condition indicator performance on rotorcraft 
fleets, results of more than five years of health monitoring for gear faults in the entire HUMS equipped Army helicopter fleet 
will be presented. More than ten examples of gear faults indicated by the gear CI have been compiled and each reviewed for 
accuracy. False alarms indications will also be discussed. Performance data from test rigs and seeded fault tests will also be 
presented. 
The results of the fleet analysis will be discussed, and a performance metric assigned to each of the competing algorithms. 
Gear fault diagnostic algorithms that are compliant with ADS-79A will be recommended for future use and development. 
The performance of gear algorithms used in the commercial units and the effectiveness of the gear CI as a fault identifier 
will be assessed using the criteria outlined in the standards in ADS-79A-HDBK, an Army handbook that outlines the 
conversion from Reliability Centered Maintenance to the On-Condition status of Condition Based Maintenance.  
INTRODUCTION 
To date, the U.S. Army Condition Based Maintenance 
(CBM) program has equipped approximately 1,000 H-64,  
H-60, and H-47 series aircraft with HUMS, referred to as 
digital source collectors (DSCs), and suites of 
accelerometers. All drive train gear sets, including fixed-axis 
and epicyclic, are monitored by these systems. A variety of 
signal processing algorithms (Condition Indicators or CIs) 
have been developed to detect incipient faults in the gear 
sets by various government agencies and commercial 
vendors.  
The traditional methods of calculating gear vibration 
based condition indictors use a statistical measurement of 
vibration energy. Differences in condition indicators are 
based on which of the characteristic frequencies are 
included, excluded, or used as a reference. Many of these 
different condition indicators have been evaluated 
experimentally by the US Navy and NASA using gearbox 
test stands and gear seeded faults. The various gear 
condition indicators used on Army aircraft vary by model 
and are based on previous test stand successful detections. 
These test stands have been the only source of ground proof 
data that directly associate faulted gears to changes in CIs.  
The Army has amassed nearly a decade of DSC CI data 
that includes thousands of hours of healthy and faulted gear 
vibration signatures. The vibration data and CI trends have 
been cross-referenced with historical information about the 
removal of gearboxes and their associated tear down 
analyses. As part of the CBM program, it is desired to 
continuously improve the functionality of the gear 
monitoring functions in the DSCs. The Aviation Engineering 
Directorate therefore is tasked by the Army to review the 
effectiveness of gear CIs according to Aeronautical Design 
Standard Handbook (ADS-79A-HDBK) for Condition Based 
Maintenance Systems for US Army Aircraft Systems. The 
ADS-79A prescribes required detection rates for CIs and 
other vibration health measurements in order to extend gear 
life and meet CBM objectives. The ADS-79A refers to True 
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Positives (correctly identifying a fault), True Negatives 
(correctly identifying a no fault condition), False Positives 
(incorrectly identifying a no fault condition), and False 
Negatives (incorrectly identifying a fault). FPs and FNs 
impact the airworthiness of the CBM system and therefore 
must be minimized.  
This paper is a compilation of gear failures that have been 
recorded by two Army installed DSCs, the Modern Signal 
Processing Unit (MSPU) and the Integrated Vehicle Health 
Monitoring System (IVHMS). The former is installed on the 
Apache and the latter is installed on the Blackhawk. 
Algorithms that are automatically calculated by the on board 
systems are presented, as are algorithms that have been 
developed more recently. These additional algorithms have 
been post processed using the recorded data. Special 
attention has been paid to an algorithm, used for gear 
diagnostics, known widely as FM4, an algorithm which has 
8 or more variants. The next section will define the FM4 
variants that are most widely used on Army aircraft and test 
stands.  
THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF FM4 
The definition of FM4 has changed since it was first 
developed and since then has taken on many different 
incarnations. Of course, the Army has two distinct varieties 
as installed in the IVHMS and MSPU. In the IVHMS, the 
calculation that is most similar to the traditional FM4 is 
named Residual Kurtosis. In the MSPU, the calculation that 
is most similar to the traditional FM4 is named FM4. For the 
purposes of this paper, the traditional definition of FM4 will 
be taken as follows in Table 1. Per the table, FM4 is 
calculated from time synchronous averages (TSA) and 
filtering is performed in the frequency domain on the time 
synchronous averaged signals.  
 
 
Table 1: FM4 Condition Indicator Calculation (Ref. 1) 
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FM4 is the kurtosis of the residual or difference signal 
normalized by the square of the variance (Ref. 2) and 
kurtosis is the fourth statistical moment of a signal about its 
mean (Ref. 3). The residual or difference signal is most 
commonly obtained by taking the Fast Fourier 
Transformation (FFT) of the signal average and subtracting 
the gear meshing frequency (GMF), its harmonics, and first 
order shaft-modulated sidebands around the fundamental 
GMF, then performing the inverse FFT to put the signal 
back in the time domain (Refs. 2, 3, and 4). Variations of 
this general method may involve removing different 
numbers of harmonics, or including more than one pair of 
sidebands around each harmonic (Ref. 4).  
Another method of obtaining the residual signal is 
performed by converting the signal average into the 
frequency domain and removing all frequency content that is 
above a pre-defined value, then converting back to the time 
domain. The value used for removing frequency content is 
relative to the energy of the signal, set statistically. An 
example might be two standard deviations above the average 
in the frequency domain. 
The purpose of taking the kurtosis of any signal is to 
identify the presence of peaks. When normalized by the 
squared variance, the kurtosis becomes a measure of both 
the number and amplitude of the peaks (Ref. 6). The 
normalized kurtosis of a sine wave is 1.5, while a normal 
distribution is 3.0 (Ref. 7). Normalized kurtosis values 
greater than 3.0 indicate peaks in the distribution. FM4 
applies the normalized kurtosis to the residual signal, where 
peaks would indicate an irregularity with the gear, since all 
expected frequencies have been removed. FM4 should rise 
with the presence of a local fault, but fall as the fault 
distributes because the rising energy of the signal means the 
normalization factor, the squared variance, is increasing. 
In both the MSPU and IVHMS, the built in FM4 
algorithms are trusted indicators of gear health and the 
traditional threshold is typically between 5 and 7. In fact, 
FM4 has given good results on test stands when single tooth 
faults are introduced (Ref. 5) 
The Army has experienced a very high FP rate with the 
use of FM4 on both the Blackhawk and Apache. FM4 has 
demonstrated that it is sensitive to unusual mesh patterns 
discovered during gearbox tear down analysis. These 
gearboxes were then subject to engineering scrutiny and it 
was determined that the perceived problem did not impact 
the airworthiness of the gearbox. 
While a high FP rate does not impact the airworthiness of 
the CBM system, it does reduce crew members’ trust of the 
DSC readings and negatively impact any cost savings 
associated with the installation of a DSC. The goal of CBM is 
to reduce maintenance time and cost, so FPs must be avoided. 
The following sections therefore detail the path forward 
for Army gear diagnostics. The authors will show the FM4 
variant diagnostics that are capable of identifying TPs and 
TNs and are correctly implemented such that they do not 
result in any FPs or FNs. The data used in these sections is 
taken directly from the Army database of on aircraft ground 
truth data.  
The authors will further show the gear diagnostics other 
than FM4 that have successfully identified, based on the 
standards set forth in the ADS-79A, the condition of gears 
removed from Apache nose gearboxes. It is important to 
note here that there have not been any monitored/recorded 
Blackhawk gear failures and therefore IVHMS algorithms 
were evaluated using the Apache data. 
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
FPs erode confidence in the DSC and increase 
maintenance time and costs. A number of FPs have been 
identified from both the Blackhawk and Apache fleets. 
These FP cases were used to analyze known variants of the 
FM4 algorithm to determine if and how the variants perform 
differently. 
The FM4 variants differ both in the way that the 
difference signal is calculated and in the way that the 
difference signal is reconstructed after the desired tones are 
removed. Table 2 illustrates the naming convention and 
techniques used to calculate FM4 variants. 
Time synchronous averages were used to calculate all 
known variants of FM4 for confirmed FP cases. Figure 1 
shows an example FP from aircraft 07-05514. The variants 
behave similarly, with the variant that removes all tones 
greater than the mean of the time synchronous averages plus 
two standard deviations (known as Residual Kurtosis) 
performing slightly better. Table A1 in the appendix 
summarizes how the variants perform for all the FP cases. 
Although this algorithm performs significantly better than 
the others, it does not comply with ADS-79A requirements, 
because of its 69% false positive rate for gear components 
monitored on 8 different helicopters.  
 
Table 2. FM4 Variants and Definitions 
CI Filter Difference Signal 
Reconstruction Method 
FM4 Trad. Sine Remove gear mesh & harmonics, 1st order side bands, shaft 1/rev, 2/rev Sine wave interpolation 
FM4 Trad. FFT Remove gear mesh & harmonics, 1st order side bands, shaft 1/rev, 2/rev Inverse FFT 
FM4 >2STD (Residual 
Kurtosis) 
Remove all tones greater than the mean(FFT(TSA)) plus 2*standard 
deviation(abs(FFT(TSA))) 
Inverse FFT 
FM4 CoIn. Rem. Remove gear mesh & harmonics, 1st order side bands from both gear of interest 
and attached gears, shaft 1/rev, 2/rev 
Sine wave interpolation 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. FM4 Variants calculated for FP Cases from 07-05514. 
 
Unfaulted  
Caution  
Advisory 
The next step taken was to evaluate the effectiveness of 
all FM4 variants from confirmed damaged gears. 
Unfortunately, only Apache nose gearboxes populate the 
Army’s list of confirmed gear damage cases through tear 
down analysis. Twelve separate nose gearboxes (NGB) were 
identified and included in the analysis. The damage 
sustained by the gears varies from gearbox to gearbox, but 
the typical failure modes are spalling, pitting, and excessive 
wear, examples of which are shown in Figures 2 and 3. In 
addition to the 12 helicopter gearboxes, data from damaged 
gears recorded from the University of South Carolina Tail 
Rotor Drive Train test stand and the NASA Glenn Spur Gear 
Fatigue Rig is also included in the table.  
The FM4 variants were calculated for all the faulted cases 
and the results are summarized in Table 3. At the end of the 
table, the ADS-79A batting average is calculated to show 
overall on aircraft effectiveness of the CI. Batting average is 
the total number of TNs and TPs divided by the number of 
data points. Any N/A results shown in this section indicate 
that there was insufficient data to calculate the CI. A Y 
indicates that the CI responded to the gear damage and 
likewise N indicates no response. All FM4 variants 
performed poorly. 
Four other CIs were calculated using the gear fault data. 
The FM4 algorithm derivatives are FM4*, NA4, NA4*, and 
NA4reset. These algorithms were developed to correct the 
shortcomings of FM4 and are defined in Table 4. Their 
results are displayed in Table 5. FM4* and NA4 performed 
the best with a true positive rate of 67%. 
 
  
Figure 2. Example of typical gear damage found in the 
Apache nose gearbox. 
 
  
Figure 3. Additional examples of typical gear damage 
found in the Apache nose gearbox. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Summary of faulted gear cases and FM4 variant calculations 
Tail Component FM4 Sine FM4 FFT FM4 >2STD FM4 CoIn Rem. 
01-05277 #1NGB Y Y N Y 
03-05363 #1NGB N N N N 
07-05508 #1NGB N N N N 
96-05010 #1NGB N N N N 
99-05144 #1NGB N N N N 
00-05187 #2NGB N N N N 
02-05303 #2NGB Y Y N Y 
00-05195 #2NGB N N N N 
00-05206 #2NGB N/A N/A N/A N/A  
00-05208 #2NGB N N N N 
02-05331 #2NGB N N N N 
90-00337 #2NGB N N N N 
USC Test Stand TGB N N N N 
NASA Test Stand Bevel Gear N/A N/A N/A N 
Batting Average 0.167 0.167 0 0.153 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: CI Calculations 
CI Filter Formula Numerator Denominator  Threshold 
Value 
NA4 Remove gear 
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hypothesis test. If it falls within the 
limit of a healthy dataset it is 
included in the den. 
5 
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Reset 
Same as NA4 Same as NA4 Same as NA4 Reset when load varies x% 5 
FM4* Same as FM4 Same as FM4 except running 
average in denominator 
Same as FM4 Each new den. is tested via a 
hypothesis test. If it falls within the 
limit of a healthy dataset it is 
included in the den. 
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Table 5. Summary of effectiveness of FM4 derivatives calculated from faulted gear cases 
Tail Component FM4* NA4 NA4* NA4 Reset 
01-05277 #1NGB N/A Y N/A Y 
03-05363 #1NGB Y N N N 
07-05508 #1NGB Y Y Y N 
96-05010 #1NGB N/A Y N/A N 
99-05144 #1NGB N/A N N/A N 
00-05187 #2NGB Y Y Y N 
02-05303 #2NGB N/A Y N/A Y 
00-05195 #2NGB N N N N 
00-05206 #2NGB N/A N/A N/A N/A 
00-05208 #2NGB N N N N 
02-05331 #2NGB N/A Y N/A N 
90-00337 #2NGB N/A Y N/A N 
USC Test Stand TGB Y Y Y N/A 
NASA Test Stand Bevel Gear N/A N/A N/A Y 
Batting Average 0.667 0.667 0.5 0.25 
 
 
 
 
 
Since the Army database of on-aircraft faulted gear cases 
only included Apache nose gearboxes, it was deemed 
necessary to compare results to other types of gears. The 
NASA Spiral Bevel Gear Fatigue rig and the University of 
South Carolina AH-64 Tail Rotor Test Stand were identified 
as having the gear failure results necessary to compare to the 
on-aircraft results. Several plots of different CIs calculated 
for faulted cases on the test stand are shown in Appendix A. 
FM4 is currently used as a primary condition indicator for 
gear health on US Army HUMS-equipped helicopters. 
Because of FM4’s unacceptable performance, replacements 
for it must be identified. The gear damage cases that were 
used to evaluate the effectiveness of FM4 were used this 
time to identify the condition indicators that did react to the 
gear damage. Sideband Index (SI), Data Algorithm one 
(DA1), and Sideband Level Factor (SLF) responded well to 
the gear damage shown above. These algorithms are defined 
in Table 6. Additional details can be found in Appendix B. 
The case by case results of the condition indicators are 
shown in Table 7. SI performed very well with a true 
positive rate of 93%. 
 
 
 
Table 6: CI Calculations 
CI Description Formula Threshold Value 
SI The average of the first order sidebands of the fundamental gear meshing frequency ܵܫ ൌ
ܴூ,ିଵ
௘௦௕ ሺݔሻ ൅ ܴூ,ାଵ
௘௦௕ ሺݔሻ
2
 10 
SLF 
Sum of the first order sideband amplitudes of the 
fundamental gear meshing frequency normalized 
by the RMS of the synchronous time average 
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 5 
DA1 RMS of the STA subtracted from the mean of the synchronous time average.  ܦܣ1 ൌ ܴܯܵሺܵܶܣ െ ܵܶܣ
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Table 7. Results of best performing CIs for damaged gears. 
Tail Component  DA1  SLF  SI 
01-05277 #1NGB Y N Y 
03-05363 #1NGB N Y Y 
07-05508 #1NGB Y Y Y 
96-05010 #1NGB Y N Y 
99-05144 #1NGB Y N Y 
00-05187 #2NGB Y N Y 
02-05303 #2NGB Y N Y 
00-05195 #2NGB N/A N Y 
00-05206 #2NGB Y N Y 
00-05208 #2NGB N Y N 
02-05331 #2NGB N Y Y 
90-00337 #2NGB Y Y Y 
USC Test Stand TGB Y N Y 
NASA Test Stand Bevel Gear Y N Y 
Batting Average 0.769 0.357 0.929 
 
SUMMARY  
False Positives 
Blackhawk and Apache helicopter FM4 FP cases were 
gathered. All known FM4 algorithms were calculated for 
each FP case obtained. There were four separate FM4 
algorithms calculated. The purpose of this analysis was to 
determine if one of the algorithms reduced the number of 
false positives. The results have shown that one algorithm 
produced slightly fewer FPs, but did not reduce FPs to a rate 
acceptable according to the ADS-79A. To calculate the 
comprehensive ineffectiveness of FM4, its TP rate was 
analyzed.  
FM4 Derivatives and Faulted Cases 
Some of the algorithms that were created to correct the 
shortcomings of FM4 had success in identifying the gear 
faults. Notably FM4* and NA4 reacted to gear damage in 
over half of the applicable cases. However, these algorithms 
present difficulties regarding implementation in the Army 
fleet. FM4* requires 30 previous TSAs to calculate its 
denominator. This poses problems for use in a maintenance 
environment where components are continuously being 
changed and moved between aircraft. There will not be a CI 
value for FM4* for newly equipped helicopters until at least 
30 data points are collected, and the on-board system does 
not know when a gearbox is replaced. Furthermore, a new 
nominal value would need to be calculated for a good 
gearbox but there is no way of knowing that information 
currently. FM4* requires either data to be stored on the on-
board system to calculate the new CI value or it would have 
to be calculated on a ground-based station. If the latter 
option is selected, FM4* cannot be used for real-time in-
flight diagnostics. NA4 poses identical problems. Since its 
denominator calculates the average variance of all previous 
TSAs, all of the above is also applicable to NA4. Also, NA4 
is known to be very sensitive to changes in torque (Ref. 8). 
Therefore it would only be feasible to calculate FM4* and 
NA4 on a ground-based system. 
Test Stands 
Comparative test stand results were found to be similar to 
that of the on-aircraft results. The FM4 algorithms, as 
defined by several sources, do not comply with the ADS-
79A detection requirements or FP rates. FM4*, NA4, and 
NA4* responds to the gear damage simulated on the USC 
test stand, and NA4 reset responds well to the NASA test 
stand gear damage. 
SI, SLF, and DA1 
These gear diagnostic algorithms responded particularly 
well to the gear damage, notably SI and DA1. These two 
algorithms also responded to the test stand cases. Results can 
be seen in the Appendix A. 
CONCLUSIONS 
No variant of FM4 consistently diagnoses gear faults on 
Army aircraft. While FM4* and NA4 are usually responsive 
to faults, they are incompatible with ADS-79A because of 
their burdensome data requirements, false positives, and the 
need for more detailed component tracking. All cases 
presented are spiral bevel gear sets, which comprise most 
but not all critical drivetrain gear sets in Army aircraft. FM4 
may still be acceptable for use on other gear types, where the 
contact ratio is significantly different than on spiral bevel 
gear sets.  
Three algorithms have proven reliable on most spiral 
bevel gear damage cases examined: Sideband Index, 
Sideband Level Factor, and DA1. These algorithms warrant 
further research and enhancement.  
 
  
APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1. Results of FM4 Variants Calculated from FP Cases 
Tail Component Number of 
Instances 
FM4 Sine FM4 FFT FM4 
>2STD 
FM4 CoIn 
Rem. 
00-05189 IGB 1 1 1 1 1 
02-05302 IGB 11 10 11 9 10 
02-05307 TGB 12 12 12 9 12 
04-05425 TGB 15 15 15 13 15 
07-05514 TGB 8 8 8 7 8 
02-05329 TGB 28 28 28 9 28 
04-05466 TGB 18 17 18 15 17 
H60 585 MBG 3 3 3 3 3 
Totals 96 94 96 66 94 
Percent of Total 98% 100% 69% 98% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1: NASA Spiral Bevel Gear Rig NA4 reset and FM4 Response to Gear Damage. 
 
 
Figure A2: NASA Spiral Bevel Gear Rig NA4 reset and DA1 Response to Gear Damage. 
 
 
Figure A3: NASA Spiral Bevel Gear Rig NA4 reset and SI Response to Gear Damage. 
 
 
Figure A4: NASA Spiral Bevel Gear Rig Gear Damage. 
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Figure A5: USC Test Stand FM4 Variants’ Response to Gear Damage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A6: USC Test Stand FM4 Derivatives’ Response to Gear Damage. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A7: USC Test Stand SI Response to Gear Damage. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A8: USC Test Stand DA1 Response to Gear Damage 
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APPENDIX B: CI DEFINITIONS 
Sideband index (SI) is a measure of local gear faults and 
is defined as the average of the order sidebands of the 
fundamental gear meshing frequency R (Ref. 6). An increase 
in magnitude of the sidebands of the fundamental gear 
meshing frequency drives this CI and indicates a local fault. 
 ܵܫ ൌ
ோ಺,షభ
೐ೞ್ ሺ௫ሻାோ಺,శభ
೐ೞ್ ሺ௫ሻ
ଶ
 
Sideband level factor (SLF) is a coarse indicator of single 
tooth damage or gear shaft damage. It is defined as the sum 
of the first order sideband amplitudes of the fundamental 
gear meshing frequency normalized by the RMS of the 
synchronous time average (Ref. 6). It differs from SI by the 
normalization by RMS which makes the CI less sensitive to 
overall increases in energy. 
 ܵܮܨ ൌ
ோ಺,షభ
೐ೞ್ ሺ௫ሻାோ಺,శభ
೐ೞ್ ሺ௫ሻ
ோெௌሺ௫ሻ
 
DA1 is the root mean square (RMS) of the TSA 
subtracted from the mean of the time synchronous average. 
DA1 detects an overall energy increase in the signal 
indicating a distributed gear fault. 
 ܦܣ1 ൌ ܴܯܵሺܶܵܣ െ ܶܵܣതതതതതሻ 
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